BEYOND SECTION 214: UNLOCKING STATE POLICE POWERS UNDER THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION

Abstract

The intractable insecurity in Nigeria has reignited debates on whether states can constitutionally establish their own policing apparatuses. The conventional view, anchored in a literal reading of section 214 of the Nigerian Constitution (CFRN) and Item 45 of the Exclusive Legislative List, insists that police powers belong exclusively to the federal government. This paper challenges that orthodoxy. Using doctrinal analysis, the paper draws on the implicit constitutional distinction between police force and state policing. The paper draws on the residual legislative competence of states under section 4(7)(a) and – most critically – the state competence to regulate private defence of persons or property in section 33(2)(a). We argue that the Constitution contains a fully articulated framework for state-level policing. Section 33(2)(a) is not merely a fundamental rights proviso; it imposes a constitutional legislative obligation on the states to permit the use of reasonable force for private defence of persons or property. That obligation is specifically fundamental; thus, it cannot be pre-empted by federal legislation, including the Nigeria Police Act or the Firearms Act. We further demonstrate that private security mechanisms fall within the residual powers of states. Federal governments' attempts to regulate them are unconstitutional. The paper, for states still clamouring for a constitutional amendment to establish a 'State Police Force', offers practical pathways to operationalise state policing under existing constitutional provisions rather than waiting for such an amendment. The current monolithic policing structure, the paper concludes, is not only unconstitutional but also incapable of addressing Nigeria’s diverse security challenges.